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DISQUALmFICATION OF JUDGE BY INTEREST--AFPINITY. State
v. Wall, 26 So. R. Fla. 1020, (1900). The Supreme Court of
Florida has just decided that a man is related by affinity to the
husband of his wife's niece. There is a statute in force in that state
providing that no person shall sit as judge in any case where he is
related to either of the parties whether by consanguinity or affinity.
In the present case, the judge, being the husband of the complain-
ant's wife's aunt, had refused to preside at the trial. This was an
action to compel him to do so. The Supreme Court sustained him
in his refusal.
In Anderson's Dictionary of Law, "affinity" is defined as "the
connection which arises from marriage between the husband and the
bload-r'elative of the wife, and between the wife and the blood-relatives
of the husband." It would appear that there was no affinity
between the judge and the complainant. There is no blood-rela-
tionship between his wife and the niece's husband-there is no com-
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mon ancestor from whom they can trace their descent. The Florida
Court gets around this difficulty by taking it that husband and wife
are one, in law, and since she is related by affinity to the niece's
husband, he is also. See Kelly v. Neely, 12 Ark. 657, (1852).
There is a dictum of Chancellor Walworth in the case of Paddock
v. Wells, 2 Barb. (Chancery) 331, (1847), in which he states that
relationship by affinity may also exist between the husband and one
who is connected by marriage with a blood-relative of the wife. He
gives as an example the marriage of two strangers to sisters, and
states that they are related in the second degree of affinity just as the
sisters are in the second degree of consanguinity.
His statements, however, were entirely unnecessary, as the party
in question was the first cousin of a former husband of the defendant,
issue of which marriage were still surviving.
There was likewise clearly affinity in the other New York case
of R. R. v, Schuyler, 28 How. Pr. 187, (1855).
It may be safely said that the question is an open one in the
majority of the states. It is well settled that a man's brother is
not related by affinity to those to whom he is so related: Rank v.
Sheu e, 4 Watts 218, (1835); Chase v. Jennings, 38 Me. 44 (1854);
Bigelow v. Sprague, 140 Mass. 425, (1886). In these states the ques-
tion in the present case has not been raised.
Some authorities consider that these cases show a tendency to
oppose the Florida doctrine if the case should arise. But there
seems to be nothing to lead to this conclusion. If these cases had
been tried in Florida, the same decision would have been rendered.
There are, however, many cases which flatly contradict the present
decision. Hume v. Bank, 10 Lea (Tenn.) 1, (1882), following Moses
v. State, 11 Humph. 232, (1850), holds that it is impossible to apply
the rule contended for that husband and wife are to such an extent
one as to make her relations by affinity his. If there is any such
rule, the wife's existence is merged in that of the husband, which
would defeat the contention that the husband stands in the place of
the wife: O'Neal v. State, 47 Ga. 229, (1872).
The case of Chinn v. State, 47 Ohio St. 575, (1890), is in direct con-
flict with Chancellor Walworth's dictum, above referred to. There
it was held that a man and his wife's brother's wife were not related
by affinity. Likewise Christian, in his note to I Blackstone, 435,
declared that even where by the law it is unlawful to marry one
related by affinity, a man may marry his wife's brother's wife, the
circumstances permitting.
Possibly the most recent case holding the view opposite to State v.
Wall is Tegarden v. Phillips, 42 N. E. (Ind.) 549, (1895), which is
exactly parallel to the present case. In this case the judge admits
that a line of affinity extends from the husband to the wife's blood
and vice versa; but he denies that new blood can be introduced by
the marriage of the affinity relatives of either.
The great question seems to be, are husband and wife one person,
or are they for the present purposes united by the strongest kind of
an affinity, which would, however, prevent any relationship between
the husband and the wife's affinity relatives.
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However, which is the better rule on grounds of public policy?
The doctrine, of course, was established to prevent interested parties
from acting as judges; and, to this end, some fixed rule had to be
adopted. Unsatisfactory it was of necessity. Frequently the great-
est temptation to partiality occurs in the trial of an intimate friend
who falls within no prohibitory clause, on the .ground of relationship.
The family spirit of to-day is hardly the same powerful influence
that it was a century ago, and while not to be disregarded, should
warrant a restrictive and not a broad construction of such a statute
as the present. It may be that there is as much inclination to favor
your wife's niece's husband as to favor your wife's nephew, but there
must be a line of demarcation somewhere.'
PRomssoRy NOTES-CONTRACT OF INDORSER-PAROL EvI-
DENCE TO VARY. Northern National Bank v. Hooves, 98 Fed. 935,
(1900). This case was decided in the Circuit Court, having come up
in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The decision was rendered
by Judge Dallas. It is of importance because of throwing light on
the vexed question-in Pennsylvania, at least-of the admission of
parol evidence to vary the contract of an indorser on a promissory
note.
The defendant in the case under consideration alleged that an
express oral agreement, made at the time the note was indorsed,
was to the effect that if the maker was not satisfied with the work
to be done by the promisee in consideration of the .note, the note
was to remain unpaid. To quote from the opinion: "The oral
agreement alleged is in direct contradiction of the absolute obliga-
tion incurred by the defendant's indorsement of the note sued on,
and it cannot be received to annex a condition to that obligation."
The question of the place of contract was not germane, for the
case dealt not with local, but general commercial law. Sift v. Tyson,
16 Pet. 1, (1842), and subsequent cases are cited to confirm this
point.
"In Pennsylvania, it is true, it has been decided that the contract
evidenced by the blank indorsement of a promissory note. is not
subject to the rule which excludes oral evidence to alter or vary
the terms of a written agreement: Boss v. Espy, 66 Pa. 482, (1870).
But the distinction upon which this decision was based seems to me
to be unwarranted. The contract of indorsement is not an ' implied'
one. An implied contract, in the legal sense of the term, is one
which has no existence in fact, but which the law for the further-
ance of justice imposes upon a party, who, under the circumstances
of the case, ought to be held as if he had contracted, though in
truth he never contracted at all. It is founded upon legal obliga-
tion, but is actually non-existent, whereas the contract of indorse-
ment is a veritable one, in which the element of consent is always
present. ' It is an express contract, and is in writing, some of the
terms of which, according to the custom of merchants, and for the
convenience of commerce, are usually omitted, but not the less on
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that account perfectly understood. All its terms are certain, fixed
and definite, and when necessary, supplied by that common knowl-
edge, based on universal custom which has made it both safe and
convenient to rest the rights and obligations of parties to such
instruments upon an abbreviation, so that the mere name of the
indorser, signed upon the back of a negotiable instrument, conveys
and expresses his meaning and intention as fully and completely as
if he had written out the customary obligation of his contract in
full:' " Martin v. Cole, 104 U. S. 37, (1881).
The cases on this point are numerous and the question well nigh
settled. See Chaddock v. Vannes, 35 N. J. Law, 517, (1871); Bank
v. Dunn, 6 Pet. (U. S.) 51, (1832); Bast v. Bank, 101 U. S. 93,
(1879).
Indeed, even in Pennsylvania, Phillips v. Meily, 106 Pa. 536,
(1884), seems to throw much doubt upon, if not to directly overrule,
Roms v. Espy. It is to be hoped that decisions like the one under
consideration will do much to settle the doubt in Irennsylvania,
where to-day the question is still in dispute.
